Blumenthal Announces Congressional Inquiry into Starlink & Starshield

[WASHINGTON, D.C.] – U.S. Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Ranking Member of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI), announced today a new inquiry into SpaceX’s Starlink and Starshield technologies, including how the taxpayer-funded military communications capability was degraded for Ukraine without notice, the process for making that decision, and the future implications of the Department of Defense’s singular dependence on SpaceX for critical satellite communications. Blumenthal’s letters to Hegseth and SpaceX CEO Elon Musk follow new reporting in the Wall Street Journal that Elon Musk ordered a restriction in Ukraine’s connectivity to these critical battlefield technologies following a conversation with President Donald Trump.

In a letter to Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Blumenthal wrote: “A decision to degrade service, applied quickly and without notice, has disabled missions across an entire military theater. Whether that change was directed by the White House, DoD, or SpaceX, the episode raises urgent questions about who possesses the technical and legal authority to alter these capabilities, what safeguards govern that authority, and whether DoD has sufficient alternatives if SpaceX-provided services become unavailable.”

“Congress has a responsibility to ensure that capabilities paid for by the American people are governed by clear, lawful and accountable processes, and that DoD is not dependent on any single company for communications that our armed forces need to fight and survive.”

In a letter to Musk, Blumenthal asked for information about SpaceX’s contracts with the Department of Defense as well as the company’s ability to interfere with or alter access to Starshield. Last week, Blumenthal wrote SpaceX Acting General Counsel David Harris seeking additional answers about any involvement SpaceX may have had in Ukraine’s restricted access to Starshield as well as the role SpaceX plays in Ukraine’s ongoing access to Starlink technology.

The full text of Blumenthal’s letter to Hegseth is available here. The full text of Blumenthal’s letter to Musk is available here and below.

Mr. Musk,

On October 13, the Ukrainian military's access to SpaceX's Starshield satellite communications service was restricted without notice and new reporting indicates that it was at your direction.^[1] This decision to limit critical technology for a key ally not only put Ukrainian forces at risk and their people in peril, but raises serious questions about who controls critical capabilities the U.S. government has spent billions of dollars to procure, how decisions to restrict it are made, and whether the U.S. Government’s reliance on SpaceX could expose U.S. forces to similar disruptions.^[2] The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (the “Subcommittee”) is opening an inquiry into the U.S. Government’s interaction with and reliance upon SpaceX technology including Starlink satellite services and Starshield. Accordingly, I write to request information and documents regarding not just the decision to limit Ukraine’s access to Starshield, but the federal government’s access to and dependance on Starlink and Starshield technology to protect our national security.

In the late evening of October 13, Ukrainian forces lost critical access to Starshield—the military-grade counterpart to SpaceX's Starlink network—after their access to speeds at which equipment could stay connected to the network was capped.^[3] According to Ukrainian officials, devices using Starshield services stopped functioning properly when mounted on drones and other fast-moving platforms, all while Russia unleashed dozens of ballistic missiles across the country.^[4] Ukraine said it received no advance warning and that several missions failed as a result.^[5] On October 19, President Zelenskyy confirmed to me on a call that access to critical Starlink services remains degraded, including for systems traveling at speeds above 100 miles per hour, impairing Ukraine’s ability to intercept Russian drones.

The public record now contains conflicting accounts of both who ordered the restriction and who implemented it. Early reporting initially attributed the restriction to SpaceX. On October 14, however, you asserted that Starshield systems are “owned and controlled by the US government,” and that limits on their use are set by the U.S. military and, ultimately, the President.^[6] On October 15, 2026, Reuters cited two U.S. officials in reporting that the order to limit Ukraine's Starshield service originated inside the White House and was conveyed to DoD leadership.^[7] A senior Ukrainian official told Reuters that Kyiv was informed it was a White House decision.^[8] However, a senior U.S. official, by contrast, said the President made no such request.^[9] On October 16, President Trump further denied that the United States imposed any limit on Ukraine's Starshield access, adding to the conflicting public accounts of what occurred.^[10] That same day, The Telegraph reported that it was you who pitched President Trump on implementing a speed cap, and that the President subsequently “agreed.”^[11] New reporting now confirms that you spoke with the President and several other senior administration officials prior to and after imposing the speed cap.^[12]

Satellite communications are no longer simply a support function. They now guide drones, communicate targeting data, coordinate logistics, and connect commanders and forces in the field.^[13] DoD and the Intelligence Community have awarded SpaceX billions of dollars for national security capabilities, including Starlink and Starshield services, dedicated military satellite systems, and a classified reconnaissance constellation for the National Reconnaissance Office.^[14]

The events in Ukraine show how a single point of control can be turned against the forces that depend on it. A decision to degrade service, applied quickly and without notice, has disabled missions across an entire military theater. Whether that change was directed by the White House, DoD, or SpaceX, the episode raises urgent questions about who possesses the technical and legal authority to alter these capabilities and what safeguards govern that authority.

Congress has a responsibility to ensure that capabilities paid for by the American people are governed by clear, lawful and accountable processes. To assist the Subcommittee’s understanding of these events and the federal government’s relationship with SpaceX as it relates to Starlink and Starshield, please provide written answers to the following questions by November 5, 2026.

1. From October 10 to October 15, 2026, please describe any Starshield or Starlink capabilities or access points that were restricted for Ukrainian assets, including the date the restriction went into place and the duration of that restriction.
2. For each restriction identified in response to Question 1, please identify all personnel involved in or notified of the decision to restrict Starshield services, including for example, the reported restriction affecting devices traveling faster than 100 mph. In the event that SpaceX was not directly involved in the decision, please detail when and how SpaceX was notified of that decision and how the directive to restrict capabilities was communicated to SpaceX.
3. For each restriction listed in response to Question 1, please describe the process for implementing the restriction, whether officials at SpaceX carried out the implementation, who those officials were, and, to the extent that DoD personnel were involved in the implementation, please describe their roles and list their names and titles.
4. Was Ukraine notified in advance of any changes to their ability to access Starshield? If not, why not? What protocols govern notice to partners before their access to U.S.-provided Starshield capabilities is changed?
5. Under SpaceX’s contracts with DoD, who holds the authority to activate, restrict, geofence, or shut off Starshield service, and under what conditions?
6. Can SpaceX technically alter, geofence or degrade Starshield service for U.S. or partner forces, without DoD authorization?
7. What is the legal and contractual basis for Ukraine's use of Starshield, and who has authority to modify or revoke that access?
8. Provide the total value of all SpaceX contracts, task orders, and other transactions with the U.S. Government for Starlink and Starshield services, terminals, and dedicated satellites since fiscal year 2020, by component and fiscal year. Provide all contract numbers, and indicate which awards were made on a sole-source basis and what justification was provided for that decision.
9. Please describe the extent to which Starshield is independent of the commercial Starlink network? Have outages or disruptions affected both at the same time, and what were the effects on U.S. or partner operations?

Please also produce the following documents and communications, for the period from January 1, 2026, to the present unless otherwise noted:

1. 1. All Records^[15] documenting, approving, or otherwise referring to the restriction of Ukraine’s access to Starlink or Starshield.
   2. All communications, including emails, attachments, transmitted documents, text and messaging-app messages, memoranda, and notes of meetings or calls, between SpaceX and DoD, the Executive Office of the President, including the National Security Council, referring or related to any restriction or limitation of Ukraine's access to Starshield or Starlink.
   3. All communications between SpaceX and the Government of Ukraine concerning any restrictions placed on their access to Starshield.
   4. All contracts, task orders, transaction agreements, and modifications between SpaceX and DoD for Starlink or Starshield services, terminals, or satellites since fiscal year 2020 including any provisions on control, access, or service termination, and any sole-source justifications.

In addition, I request that SpaceX officials with direct knowledge of the Starshield restriction brief the Subcommittee no later than November 12, 2026. Classified material may be segregated and provided separately through appropriate channels. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

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